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EXAMINER SYED, NABIL H				
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**Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.**

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

# Office Action Summary

**Application No.**

10/539,896

**Applicant(s)**

PACE ET AL.

**Examiner**

/NABIL H. SYED/

**Art Unit**

2612

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --  
**Period for Reply**

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

**Status**

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 10 December 2009.
- 2a) ☒ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☐ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

**Disposition of Claims**

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-24 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-24 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

**Application Papers**

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is/are: a) ☐ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.  
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).  
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

**Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119**

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some \* c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
  2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_.
  3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

\* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

**Attachment(s)**

- 1) ☐ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB/C)
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)  
Paper No(s)/Mail Date: \_\_\_\_\_
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application
- 6) ☐ Other: \_\_\_\_\_
- Paper No(s)/Mail Date: \_\_\_\_\_

**DETAILED ACTION**

1. The following is a final office action in response to the amendments filed 12/10/09. Amendments received on 12/10/09 have been entered. Claims 1-24 are pending.

**Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103**

2. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

3. Claims 1 and 2, 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kramer et al. (6,738,810) in view of Parker (6,124,799) and further in view of Seidman et al. (7,167,840).

As of claims 1 and 24, Kramer discloses a system for enabling limited time trial use products for additional pre-selected use (via a method of encouraging timely period payments that are associated with a computer system), comprising:  
a power appliance (10), which has been adapted for limited time trial use (Kramer discloses that the computer system 100 is operable to prevent use of the computer system 100 in response to no-payment of no-timely payment of a fee, this would include

a limited time initial trial use of computer system because if a user does not like the system they do not have to pay the fee and discontinue the service; see col. 3, lines 4-20; also see fig. 1 and 2); and

an enabling device (12, 14), provided to the user following authorization, to enable the appliance for additional use (via user receiving the password after making the payment to enable the device for additional use; see col. 7, lines 42-56). Kramer further discloses that the power appliance can be a power personal care appliance (via a medical diagnostic equipment; see col. 3, line 18-19). Further when the user pay his fee, the appliance is enabled permanently, the user can keep paying the monthly fee and use the services for as long as they want, without expiration.

However Kramer fails to explicitly disclose that the appliance is a hand-held personal appliance and the appliance is enabled for permanent subsequent use without expiration and without further compensation following a one-time payment.

Parker discloses a power hand-held personal care appliance (via a handset 20; see fig. 2), wherein the handset 20 is given to the user for a limited amount of time (see col. 11, lines 50-54), and handset is permanently enabled for subsequent use after the full payment (see col. 11, lines 50-60). Parker further discloses that the user can rent the handset (see col. 5, lines 15-18), and it would have been obvious that renting period can be considered as a trial use, because instead of buying a user can just rent the handset for limited time, test the device and see if they like handset and then the user can buy the handset. Even though not explicitly said, but it would have been obvious that upon ending the rental period the user can make a full time payment at once and

keep the hand set, which would allow the user to keep the handset for permanent subsequent use without expiration and without further compensation.

From the teaching of Parker it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the system of Kramer to include the step of enabling the device after a one time payment as taught by Parker in order to allow the service provider to end the rental period of the user after the service providers have subsidized the payment of the device.

Even though the Examiner believes that the combination of Kramer and Parker teaches the limitations disclosed in the independent claims, in order to support the Examiner's assertion, Seidman further discloses that it is a common practice in a business to allow a customer to use a product or service for promotional time (limited time trial), the user then review the material to decide whether or not to purchase the material (see col. 5, lines 32-39). If the user decides more rights in the material they can pay the full amount that will convert the trial use to have greater rights (see col. 5, lines 41-45).

From the teaching of Seidman it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the combination of Kramer and Parker to include the step of providing the user full authority following a one time payment provided at the end of limited time as taught by Seidman in order to increase the sale of the product or service because if the business has a product or service, then the business may wish to increase knowledge that they have this product in stock in order to increase profit.

As of claim 2, Kramer discloses the additional use is long-term use and includes all of the functions of a conventional product (Karma discloses that after entering the correct password user of the computer system 100 regains complete access to the computer system; see col. 8, lines 30-33).

4. Claims 1-3, 5-8, 10, 12, 13, 20 and 24 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Green (4,624,578) in view of Hilscher et al. (7,207,080) in view of Parker (6,124,799) and further in view of Seidman (7,167,840).

As of claims 1, 3 and 24, Green discloses a power appliance (via rental equipment 10) adapted for limited time initial trial use (via the electronic device being used for rental; see col. 2, lines 28-35 Note: if after the expiration of the first rental period, the user can pay more to keep the device, so first rental period will be considered as limited time initial trial use ), and enabling device (via a magnetic card 34) to enable the device (see fig.3; also see col. 3, lines 1-14) (Note: the rental equipment 10, is used for limited time initial trial when it is rented for the first time by any user and user can continue paying the payment for as long as they want to keep the rented equipment, so the device is enabled without expiration as long user is paying his/her fee).

However Green fails to disclose that the power appliance is a personal care appliance.

Hilscher discloses a power personal care appliance (an electronic toothbrush; see fig. 1) having a transponder communicating with a handle portion of the toothbrush via a non-contacting inductive coupling, wherein a control device 18 has an operation

inhibiting device 36 which is activated and deactivated by means of an enabling element 38 on the brush attachment 20 (see fig. 1 and fig. 18; also see col. 15, lines 15-26).

From the teaching of Hilscher it would have been obvious to one having an ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the power appliance of Green to include an electric toothbrush as taught by Hilscher in order to provide a simple travel security function for the handle section preventing the handle section from operating when the cleaning tool with its acting member is not coupled (see col. 10, lines 9-15).

However the combination of Green and Hilscher fails to explicitly disclose that the appliance is a hand-held personal appliance and the appliance is enabled for permanent subsequent use without expiration and without further compensation following a one-time payment.

Parker discloses a power hand-held personal care appliance (via a handset 20; see fig. 2), wherein the handset 20 is given to the user for a limited amount of time (see col. 11, lines 50-54), and handset is permanently enabled for subsequent use after the full payment (see col. 11, lines 50-60). Parker further discloses that the user can rent the handset (see col. 5, lines 15-18), and it would have been obvious that renting period can be considered as a trial use, because instead of buying a user can just rent the handset for limited time, test the device and see if they like the device and then the user can buy the handset. Even though not explicitly said, but it would have been obvious that upon ending the rental period the user can make a full time payment at once and

keep the hand set, which would allow the user to keep the handset for permanent subsequent use without expiration and without further compensation.

From the teaching of Parker it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the combination of Green and Hilscher to include the step of enabling the device after a one time payment as taught by Parker in order to allow the service provider to end the rental period of the user after the service providers have subsidized the payment of the device.

Even though the Examiner believes that the combination of Kramer and Parker teaches the limitations disclosed in the independent claims, in order to support the Examiner's assertion, Seidman further discloses that it is a common practice in a business to allow a customer to use a product or service for promotional time (limited time trial), the user then review the material to decide whether or not to purchase the material (see col. 5, lines 32-39). If the user decides more rights in the material they can pay the full amount that will convert the trial use to have greater rights (see col. 5, lines 41-45).

From the teaching of Seidman it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the combination of Kramer and Parker to include the step of providing the user full authority following a one time payment provided at the end of limited time as taught by Seidman in order to increase the sale of the product or service because if the business has a product or service, then the business may wish to increase knowledge that they have this product in stock in order to increase profit.



As of claim 2, Green discloses that after the insertion of the magnetic card the lessee can use all the functions of the device (see col. 2, lines 59-67).

As of claim 5, Green discloses that the magnetic card is inserted in a slot 20 of the electronic device to enable the device (see fig. 2; also see col. 2, lines 47-52).

As of claim 6, Green discloses that the power appliance has a slot 20 (see fig. 2) and the enabling device has a magnetic strip to communicate with each other (see col. 2, lines 47-60).

As of claim 7, the magnetic card 34 nestles into slot 20 of the power appliance (see col. 2, lines 60-63).

As of claim 8, Hilscher discloses that a toothbrush has a tag integrated to it and the information from the tag is received optically (see col. 2, lines 65-67).

As of claim 10, Green discloses that the communication is magnetic (see col. 3, lines 1-5).

As of claim 12, Green discloses that a separate magnetic card (enabling device) is used for each rented appliance (see col. 3, lines 7-8).

As of claim 13, Green discloses that the magnetic card is capable of enabling the device only once, because the encode information of the card is erased each time the card is used for security purposes (see col. 3, lines 8-14).

As of claim 20, Green discloses a power appliance (via rental equipment 10) adapted for limited time trial use (via the electronic device being used for rental; see col. 2, lines 28-35), wherein the actuation of switches 26 and 28 enables the power appliance (see col. 2, lines 57-59). (Note: the rental equipment 10, is used for limited

time initial trial when it is rented for the first time by any user and user can continue paying the payment for as long as they want to keep the rented equipment, so the rental period is without expiration as long user is paying his/her fee).

However Green fails to disclose that the power appliance is a personal care appliance.

Hilscher discloses a power personal care appliance (an electronic toothbrush) having a transponder communicating with a handle portion of the toothbrush via a non-contacting inductive coupling, wherein a control device 18 has an operation inhibiting device 36 which is activated and deactivated by means of an enabling element 38 on the brush attachment 20 (see fig. 1 and fig. 18; also see col. 15, lines 15-26).

However the combination of Green and Hilscher fails to explicitly disclose that the appliance is a hand-held personal appliance and the appliance is enabled for permanent subsequent use without expiration and without further compensation following a one-time payment.

Parker discloses a power hand-held personal care appliance (via a handset 20; see fig. 2), wherein the handset 20 is given to the user for a limited amount of time (see col. 11, lines 50-54), and handset is permanently enabled for subsequent use after the full payment (see col. 11, lines 50-60). Parker further discloses that the user can rent the handset (see col. 5, lines 15-18), and it would have been obvious that renting period can be considered as a trial use, because instead of buying a user can just rent the handset for limited time, test the device and see if they like the device and then the user can buy the handset.

From the teaching of Parker it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the combination of Green and Hilscher to include the step of enabling the device after a one time payment as taught by Parker in order to allow the service provider to end the rental period of the user after the service providers have subsidized the payment of the device.

5. Claims 22 and 23 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Green (4,624,578) in view of Hilscher et al. (7,207,080) in view of Parker (6,124,799) and further in view of Wada (6,728,889).

As of claim 22, Green discloses a power appliance (via rental equipment 10) adapted for limited time trial use (via the electronic device being used for rental; see col. 2, lines 28-35), wherein the switches 26 and 28 have a particular pattern (via increasing the current time if the switch 26 is closed), the switches are operable by the user using a magnetic card (see col. 5, lines 23-39). (Note: the rental equipment 10, is used for limited time initial trial when it is rented for the first time by any user and user can continue paying the payment for as long as they want to keep the rented equipment, so the rental period is without expiration as long user is paying his/her fee). However Green fails to disclose that the power appliance is a personal care appliance.

Hilscher discloses a power personal care appliance (an electronic toothbrush; see fig. 1) having a transponder communicating with a handle portion of the toothbrush via a non-contacting inductive coupling, wherein a control device 18 has an operation inhibiting device 36 which is activated and deactivated by means of an enabling element 38 on the brush attachment 20 (see fig. 1 and fig. 18; also see col. 15, lines 15-26).

From the teaching of Hilscher it would have been obvious to one having an ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the power appliance of Green to include an electric toothbrush as taught by Hilscher in order to provide a simple travel security function for the handle section preventing the handle section from operating when the cleaning tool with its acting member is not coupled (see col. 10, lines 9-15).

However the combination of Green and Hilscher fails to explicitly disclose that the appliance is a hand-held personal appliance and the appliance is enabled for permanent subsequent use without expiration and without further compensation following a one-time payment.

Parker discloses a power hand-held personal care appliance (via a handset 20; see fig. 2), wherein the handset 20 is given to the user for a limited amount of time (see col. 11, lines 50-54), and handset is permanently enabled for subsequent use after the full payment (see col. 11, lines 50-60). Parker further discloses that the user can rent the handset (see col. 5, lines 15-18), and it would have been obvious that renting period can be considered as a trial use, because instead of buying a user can just rent the handset for limited time, test the device and see if they like the device and then the user can buy the handset. Even though not explicitly said, but it would have been obvious that upon ending the rental period the user can make a full time payment at once and keep the hand set, which would allow the user to keep the handset for permanent subsequent use without expiration and without further compensation.

From the teaching of Parker it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the combination of Green and Hilscher to include the step of enabling the device after a one time payment as taught by Parker in order to allow the service provider to end the rental period of the user after the service providers have subsidized the payment of the device.

However the combination of Green and Hilscher and Parker fail to disclose that the power appliance is enabled after recognizing a preselected pattern of operation of the on/off switch.

Wada discloses a personal power appliance (via a personal computer), wherein in order to provide power to the device (enable) the password (preselected pattern) is entered via using the power switch (on/off switch) (see fig. 2; also see col. 1, lines 6-16; and col. 1, lines 60-67).

From the teaching of Wada it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the combination of Green, Hilscher and Parker to include the step of entering the enabling code via the power switch as taught by Wada in order to simplify the entry operation of the password, so there is no need to provide an extra keypad and further this process will allow an extra feature which can be used by the user to enter the code which enables the personal device.

Even though the Examiner believes that the combination of Green, Hilscher, Parker and Wada teaches the limitations disclosed in the independent claims, in order to support the Examiner's assertion, Seidman further discloses that it is a common

practice in a business to allow a customer to use a product or service for promotional time (limited time trial), the user then review the material to decide whether or not to purchase the material (see col. 5, lines 32-39). If the user decides more rights in the material they can pay the full amount that will convert the trial use to have greater rights (see col. 5, lines 41-45).

From the teaching of Seidman it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the combination of Kramer and Parker to include the step of providing the user full authority following a one time payment provided at the end of limited time as taught by Seidman in order to increase the sale of the product or service because if the business has a product or service, then the business may wish to increase knowledge that they have this product in stock in order to increase profit.

6. Claims 4, 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18 and 19 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Green 4,624,578) in view of Valiulis (6,317,028) and further in view of Parker (6,124,799).

As of claim 14, Green discloses a power appliance (via rental equipment 10) adapted for limited time trial use (via the electronic device being used for rental; see col. 2, lines 28-35), a communication element (slot 20) an external source (magnetic card) to enable the device. (Note: the rental equipment 10, is used for limited time initial trial when it is rented for the first time by any user and user can continue paying the payment for as long as they want to keep the rented equipment, so the rental period is without expiration as long user is paying his/her fee).

However Green fails to disclose that device communicate with the external source over a communication line.

Valiulis discloses electronic device with a communication element (via RFID module 83; see fig. 8), which enables and disables the device upon the signal from the user, wherein the device receives an enabling message from an external source (via other appliances) over a communication line (via a communication bus 77; see fig. 7; also see col. 15, lines 10-19).

From the teaching of Valiulis it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the power appliance of Green to include a communication line as taught by Valiulis in order to allow the device to communicate with the external devices (see col. 15, lines 9-19).

However the combination of Green and Valiulis fails to explicitly disclose that the appliance is a hand-held personal appliance and the appliance is enabled for permanent subsequent use without expiration and without further compensation following a one-time payment.

Parker discloses a power hand-held personal care appliance (via a handset 20; see fig. 2), wherein the handset 20 is given to the user for a limited amount of time (see col. 11, lines 50-54), and handset is permanently enabled for subsequent use after the full payment (see col. 11, lines 50-60). Parker further discloses that the user can rent the handset (see col. 5, lines 15-18), and it would have been obvious that renting period can be considered as a trial use, because instead of buying a user can just rent the

handset for limited time, test the device and see if they like the device and then the user can buy the handset.

From the teaching of Parker it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the combination of Green and Valiulis to include the step of enabling the device after a one time payment as taught by Parker in order to allow the service provider to end the rental period of the user after the service providers have subsidized the payment of the device.

As of claim 2, Kramer discloses the additional use is long-term use and includes all of the functions of a conventional product (Karma discloses that after entering the correct password user of the computer system 100 regains complete access to the computer system; see col. 8, lines 30-33).

As of claim 4, Valiulis discloses that the enabling device is permanently integrated within the electronic appliance (see col. 14, lines 60-67)

As of claim 9, Valiulis discloses that the communication is radio frequency (see col. 10, lines 35-40).

As of claim 11, even though not explicitly said but it would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the combination of Green and Valiulis to include infrared communication since it is well known in the art that that infrared communication is used where line of sight communication is required so a user does not activate devices in the other rooms of a house.



As of claim 15, it discloses the same subject matter as claimed in claim 2, so claim 15 is rejected as claim 2.

As of claim 16, Valiulis discloses that the communication line is telephone line (via user communicating with the registration authority over a telephone line; see col. 14, lines 42-43).

As of claim 18, Valiulis discloses that the communication line is an Internet line (via user communicating with the registration authority over a modem 57; see col. 14, lines 42-43).

As of claim 19, the combination of Green and Valiulis discloses all the elements of the claimed invention but fails to explicitly disclose that the communication element is located in a charger portion of a power appliance. It would have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify the power device of to include the communication element in the charger portion since it has been held that rearranging parts of an invention involves only routine skill in the art.

7. Claims 17 and 21 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Green (4,624,578) and view of Hilscher et al. (7,207,080).

As of claims 17, 21, they claim the same subject matter as claimed in claim 3 above, so they are rejected as claim 3.

### **Response to Arguments**

8. Applicant's arguments filed 12/10/09 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

Applicant argues that the combination of Kramer, Parker and Seidman does not disclose the concept of "limited time initial trial use" of a personal care appliance. Applicant further argues that "in applicant's invention payment is made at the end of the trial period, at which point permanent use of the appliance is enabled without further compensation, none of the references teaches such limitation." The Examiner respectfully disagrees.

First of all the Examiner would like to point out, that claim does not disclose that user does not make any payment in the beginning of the trial use, claim merely recites that a user make a one time payment at the end of the trial use. So a user can make a payment in the beginning, and then make a one time payment to buy the product at the end of the trial use and still be within the recited claim language.

Kramer discloses that a computer system 100 is operable to prevent use of the computer system 100 in response to no-payment of no-timely payment of a fee, this would include a limited time initial trial use of computer system because if a user does not like the system they do not have to pay the fee and discontinue the service; see col. 3, lines 4-20; also see fig. 1 and 2. Kramer further discloses that a power appliance can be a power personal care appliance (via a medical diagnostic equipment; see col. 3, line 18-19). Kramer further discloses that the user procure computer systems with no money down (see col. 1, lines 18-20), so when user obtain the power appliance (computer system or medical diagnostic equipment) the user does not make any payment. So a user can obtain the computer system, with out making any payment in advance, then a user can use the product for limited time (until the time of the first payment) which can

be interpreted as trial bases, and then at the end of the limited time period if user wish to purchase the product they can make a payment and buy the computer system. Note: it is common knowledge that if a user wish to make a one time payment to buy the product they can do that at any time they desire, or they could make monthly instalments to purchase a product.

Parker further discloses that the user can rent the handset (see col. 5, lines 15-18), and it would have been obvious that renting period can be considered as a trial use, because instead of buying a user can just rent the handset for limited time, test the device and see if they like handset and then the user can buy the handset. Even though not explicitly said, but it would have been obvious that upon ending the rental period the user can make a full time payment at once and keep the hand set, which would allow the user to keep the handset for permanent subsequent use without expiration and without further compensation.

Further applicant is using the reference of Seidman to indicate that it is a common practice in a business to allow a customer to use a product or service for promotional time (limited time trial), the user then review the material to decide whether or not to purchase the material (see col. 5, lines 32-39). If the user decides more rights in the material they can pay the full amount that will convert the trial use to have greater rights (see col. 5, lines 41-45).

Based on the explanation given above, it is seen that the combination of Kramer, Parker and Seidman is able to perform the function specified in the claim as presented in the present application; hence it is the Examiner's position that the claimed invention

is met by the combination of Kramer, Parker and Seidman as disclosed in the rejection above.

### **Conclusion**

9. **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.** Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire **THREE MONTHS** from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within **TWO MONTHS** of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the **THREE-MONTH** shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than **SIX MONTHS** from the mailing date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to /NABIL H. SYED/ whose telephone number is (571)270-3028. The examiner can normally be reached on M-F 7:30-5:00 alt Friday off.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Brian Zimmerman can be reached on (571)272-3059. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.

Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.

/NABIL H SYED/  
Examiner  
Art Unit 2612

N.S

/Brian A Zimmerman/  
Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2612